

India's Search for Economic Prosperity and Global Power

Kanta Murali¹

Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Toronto
kanta.murali@utoronto.ca

Ayres, Alyssa. 2018. *Our Time Has Come: How India Is Making Its Place in the World*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Joshi, Vijay. 2017. *India's Long Road: The Search for Prosperity*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Sinha, Aseema. 2016. *Globalizing India: How Global Rules and Markets Are Shaping India's Rise to Power*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Twenty-seven years after the extensive economic reforms of 1991, India stands at an inflection point. On the one hand, more than two-and-a-half decades of rapid economic growth has firmly placed it in the ranks of the world's emerging powers. On the other, India remains plagued by a variety of domestic problems and challenges—a quarter of its population remains mired in extreme poverty, public services remain woe-ful, economic inequality and exclusion along a variety of dimensions continues to rise, crony capitalism and corruption abound, the decay of numerous public institutions is all too evident, and the country has some of the highest rates of environmental pollution in the world.

Over the last four years, India has also, arguably, been witnessing one of the lowest points in its democratic history with the sharp rise of majoritarian and illiberal politics. How should we reconcile these apparently contradictory trends, between India's growth and its persistent problems? What do these trends mean for India's economic and geopolitical future? What factors are likely to affect the pace, scale, and nature of India's ongoing global integration? How is the interaction between the domestic and international realms likely to play out in this process of transformation?

Three recent accounts—Vijay Joshi's *India's Long Road*, Alyssa Ayres' *Our Time Has Come*, and Aseema

¹ I would like to thank IPP's book review editor, Arzan Tarapore, for his useful suggestions on an earlier draft.

Sinha's *Globalizing India*—offer varying insights into those questions. India's economic liberalization forms the central backdrop of all three books but each of the accounts emphasizes different aspects of the country's transformation—Joshi offers a comprehensive evaluation of India's economic performance since independence, Ayres traces the evolution of India's geopolitical role in this period, and Sinha meticulously explores the interplay between international and domestic factors in India's marked global economic integration after the late 1990s. Despite the distinct analytical focus of each author—economic performance broadly for Joshi, foreign policy for Ayres, and global economic integration for Sinha—there is common ground in their discussions and bringing the three books in conversation with each other offers useful insights. All three books view economic liberalization as fundamental to India's global rise; all three recognize, though to varying degrees, the interaction (indeed, tension at certain points) between the international and domestic realms in the process of transformation; and all three offer carefully considered analyses that have implications for India's future prospects.

Such broad overlap in their discussions aside, the books differ in important ways. Ayres is the most optimistic about India's prospects, suggesting that economic growth is likely to continue and underpin the country's rise as a global power. Joshi is far more skeptical of India's economic prospects, suggesting that "high-quality" growth, which has eluded India to date, would

demand an unprecedented raft of policy reforms. In contrast to those accounts, Sinha places greater priority on international economic institutions and trade rules as the primary catalysts for changes within the Indian state, the domestic private sector, and in state-business relations after the late 1990s. In the remainder of this essay, I outline the key arguments of each book, and offer critical analyses of how each adds to our understanding of India's economic and foreign policy prospects.

Charting India's Geopolitical Rise

In *Our Time Has Come*, Alyssa Ayres argues that India is unmistakably on the path to becoming a global power—but, for a variety of reasons including India's own foreign policy history and numerous domestic challenges, she expects this rise to occur in a "cautious" fashion. Ayres views India's economic liberalization in 1991 and the impressive economic growth that followed over the next two-and-a-half decades as the primary basis for India's rise on the global stage. Alongside economic growth, she points out that India has been steadily building its strategic capacity, adding to its leverage. In many ways, the book unambiguously celebrates India's growing geopolitical ambitions; a clear point of contrast with Joshi's book discussed later in the article.

The book is divided into three sections; the first part examines India's foreign policy history until economic liberalization, the second part focuses on the transition on India's global role

since the 1990s, and the third part evaluates India's future prospects. As India grows in economic stature on the world stage, she suggests that India simultaneously, and paradoxically, sees itself as a "great civilization with much to offer the world" while often seeking to "remain aloof of world entanglements" (65). This remains the basis of India's foreign policy thinking as it attempts to transition from a "balancing" to a "leading" power under the Modi government; a process she suggests that is a work in progress and will take time.

While the rise of India's global power can be seen in various domains, Ayres points out that India has traditionally been a cautious actor on the world stage, though the preference for caution has begun to weaken in recent times. Ayres expects India to retain some of its habitual caution even as it attempts to become a leading power, due to constraints imposed by geopolitics—particularly China's and Pakistan's strategies, India's own inheritance of non-alignment and nonintervention, and the contentious nature of its domestic politics, which she suggests constraints the country's international diplomacy. An element of suspicion of foreign involvement in India's affairs, which was at its height during Indira Gandhi's time in office in the 1970s, continues to be evident, and she cites examples such as the Foreign Contribution Regulatory Act in this regard.

The final section focuses on India's future trajectory along two lines—India's attempts to build alternative institutions at the international level

that give it greater voice and changes in the Indian economy aimed at higher growth. Given the constraints that it has faced in gaining a greater role in established multilateral institutions, Ayres suggests that India has actively been working to develop alternative institutions with other BRICS countries, Indian Ocean countries, as well as in Asia as part of its "Look East" policy. Interestingly, and perhaps unconventionally, Ayres discusses India's dominance in the International Cricket Council as an example of how a powerful India might act in the future.

Ayres recognizes that India's future prospects are predicated on continued economic growth. While identifying several current constraints to continued economic progress, she seems to be optimistic regarding India's efforts to remove some of these constraints, such as initiatives to make the manufacturing sector more competitive. The book concludes with a variety of specific recommendations for how the United States should work with a rising India such as "approach India as a joint venture partner, not an ally in waiting" (216), "bring India into economic organizations" (220), and "develop stronger bilateral trade ties" (221). In the final analysis, "India, as a major rising power of Asia, should be better understood and better appreciated on its own terms—as a competitiveness issue for U.S. economic and business interests, and as a matter of the demands of the new global diplomacy in which all of Asia plays a much more pivotal role" (242).

Domestic Factors and India's Global Ambitions: Case for Greater Pessimism

The change in India's geopolitical ambitions and the country's own understanding of its place in the world after the 1990s is effectively documented in Ayres' book. Her book is a cogent, accessible, and thorough account of India's geopolitical ascendancy since the 1990s. While the book convincingly highlights the various mechanisms through which India's attempted transformation to a leading power is occurring, the optimistic and celebratory tone with which it views these changes can be called into question for several reasons. For a start, Ayres automatically seems to assume that India's goal of becoming a leading power is a worthy one, and she neglects normative discussion of any potential costs of such ambition. As Joshi points out in his book, India's deliberate pursuit of global power comes with clear trade-offs in that it shifts the efforts of the state away from numerous domestic development challenges. Indeed, as seen elsewhere through history, foreign policy expansionism and great power ambitions can potentially be used to divert attention from major domestic failings. The potential for such diversionary tactics certainly exists, given the immense scope of India's domestic social, political, and economic challenges.

Second, Ayres underestimates the nature and significance of the links between domestic politics and India's foreign policy, especially under the

current BJP government. Ayres clearly identifies domestic politics as one of the constraints that leads to India's cautious approach on the world stage but she seems to view domestic politics primarily as a check on the speed of India's global ascendance. Rather, the case can be made that the links between foreign policy and domestic politics may be more complex. Under the current BJP government, whose activities and pronouncements related to the international arena are frequently used as examples through the book, foreign policy appears to be a key part of a broader political model that combines, among other aspects, muscular nationalism, majoritarianism, and illiberal politics. From the point of view of the quality, inclusiveness, and openness of Indian democracy, there is little to celebrate in that political model. In that sense, India's current global power ambitions are hardly benign and may have negative implications for democracy in India.

Third, and related to the point above, there appears to be a tension between notions of continuity and change in Ayres' treatment of foreign policy under the current government. She makes the case that an element of continuity in Indian foreign policy can be seen across successive Indian governments and this is demonstrated by the fact that ideas such as sovereignty and nonintervention continue to play a guiding role. But the book also draws on several examples under the Modi government, which seem to imply that the BJP's approach to foreign policy under Modi is different than those of pre-

vious governments. It is unclear whether these examples merely reflect stylistic differences with previous governments or whether there is a qualitative shift in India's foreign policy doctrine under Modi.

Fourth, Ayres' optimism of India's future economic prospects seems to downplay some of the weaknesses in India's current growth model—particularly the lack of domestic inclusiveness—and it underestimates the scale of the challenges that India needs to tackle to maintain rapid growth. She offers evidence from efforts to improve manufacturing and the case of the auto industry as one that now thrives despite various weaknesses in the past. To a certain extent, her analysis of the improved fortunes of the auto sector finds resonance with Sinha's analysis of the textile sector outlined later in this article. However, as other studies of political economy of India (e.g., Drèze and Sen 2013; Kohli 2012) point out, India's growth has not been inclusive enough; a point also emphasized strongly by Joshi. Joshi argues that changes since 1991 can be characterized as a "partial reform model" and continued adherence to this model is unlikely to achieve what he considers sustained "high-quality" growth. Given that Ayres' expectations about India's future foreign policy prospects are predicated on the country's continued economic success, these weaknesses inherent in the current growth model could potentially act as a more significant constraint on India's global ambitions than the book accounts for.

India's Economic Performance: The Past, the Present, and the Future

In several ways, Vijay Joshi's comprehensive and meticulously detailed account of India's economic performance acts as a sobering and refreshing corrective to the hype that has frequently surrounded the country's economic prospects over the last decade. Joshi's central argument is that "with 'business-as-usual' policies India will be hard put to achieve high-quality and enduring per-capita growth of even 6 per cent a year, let alone 8 per cent a year, which would be necessary for it to become a prosperous nation in the next quarter century" (5). To become a prosperous nation, India requires radical reforms along various lines.

In spelling out this argument, Joshi begins by emphasizing the enormity of the task that lies in front of India in order to achieve 'high-quality' growth, which refers to inclusive and environmentally friendly growth, and why he believes that India is likely to face an uphill task without radical changes. The reforms that began in the 1990s were effective but are now running out of steam and could only be considered partial and incomplete in the first place. The mode of policy change—"reforms by stealth"—is also unlikely to bring about the deep changes necessary to ensure high-quality growth. Further, India's rapid growth in the first decade of the 2000s was propelled by a highly liquid and expanding world economy and that such a "benign global environment looks very unlikely to return

any time soon” (7). A weak government sector and crony capitalism additionally compound existing challenges.

Interestingly, Joshi departs from standard neoliberal analyses of India’s economic performance and prospects by arguing that more liberalization is necessary but will not be sufficient to ensure and sustain “high-quality” growth. This is because the Indian state “no longer performs its core functions effectively” (7). A central weakness of the current growth model for Joshi, thus, lies in the nature of India’s state–market relationship. According to him, India has not found the correct balance between state and market to achieve “high-quality” growth. This, in turn, necessitates the need for radical reform of the state and the state–market relationship. As an interesting aside, and a clear contrast with Ayres in this regard, Joshi argues that deliberate pursuit of great power status by India would be “unwise, if not foolish,” given the scale of the domestic challenges that remain.

After offering a preview of the main argument, the book is divided into five parts. Part 1 offers an evaluation of India’s economic performance since independence, Part 2 focuses on the challenge of growth, Part 3 examines stability and inclusion, Part 4 focuses on India’s political economy, and Part 5 discusses future prospects and evaluates the performance of the Modi government on various measures required to ensure rapid and inclusive growth.

In examining the history of India’s economic performance, Joshi suggests that India’s disappointing growth

performance between 1950 and 1980 was primarily due to the fact that “Indian policymakers acted with a mistaken conception of the role of the state” (19). Joshi confirms that growth acceleration after 1980 has been most pronounced in the service sector, which also saw total factor productivity grow much faster than agriculture or industry. Unlike cases in East Asia, India has not exploited the gains associated with shifting labor out of low productivity farming. For Joshi, the marked weakness in terms of employment generation lies firmly with the nature of labor laws in India and he suggests that radical reforms in terms of flexibility, severance, and unemployment benefits and job-search training are required.

In terms of inclusion, Joshi highlights India’s gross underperformance in health and education. The problem in his view is that it has historically been taken for granted in India that the state should deliver education and healthcare. Solving this problem involves a much more extensive role for the private sector; while the state should ensure access to health and education for the poorest, the delivery of services needs to be shifted more significantly to the private sector. Two major trends—“social and political awakening” and “institutional decay”—have characterized Indian democracy for Joshi in recent years and have had effects on the state’s performance. Joshi also highlights the weakness in state capacity through a lengthy discussion on petty and grand corruption as well as crony capitalism in India. The glaring lack of state capacity and accountabili-

ty, thus, highlights the need for a radical reorientation of the involvement of the state in the economy.

In the final part of the book, Joshi reiterates the inadequacy of India's current "partial reforms model" and the need for sweeping reforms to achieve higher prosperity. He also includes an interesting evaluation of first two years of the performance of the Modi government. How has the Modi government performed? Joshi suggests the answer is "mixed at best" (309).

Politics and the Radical Reform Agenda

India's Long Road is a comprehensive, accessible, balanced, and nuanced account that is an important reading for anyone interested in India's political economy. The central argument of the book is persuasive and Joshi marshals strong evidence in support of his call for a radical reform agenda. Joshi's emphasis on the state and its role in India's future prospects is also a refreshing departure from typical analyses on the Indian economy written by economists. Despite these strengths, there are a few aspects, mainly related to the political arena, that the book downplays and could consider more substantially.

The book views the relationship between state and private business in India in a relatively simplistic fashion. In particular, the tone of the book often juxtaposes a weak and inefficient state with a dynamic private sector, and the private sector seems to be treated

as a passive recipient of economic policy decisions. There is little doubt that private sector dynamism has been a central theme of India's economic acceleration after 1991 and the state in India has exhibited growing weakness in several areas in this period. However, at least three aspects point to the need for greater complexity in the treatment of state-business relations in India, and suggest that it is important to go beyond the venal state versus passive private sector narrative.

For a start, private capital's role in broader trends of cronyism and corruption that have characterized the post-liberalization environment in India cannot be downplayed. Second, the period since the 1980s has generally been marked by a closer relationship between state and business. Arguably, the connections between the political and economic elite in India are closer now than at any other point in Indian history. Importantly, both the structural and instrumental leverage of business have grown in the post-liberalization period. This growth in leverage is evident in several arenas—for example, the growing presence of businesspersons in parliament and state legislatures, and the increased scope of activities and influence of business associations in policy arenas. As such, Indian business is not a passive recipient of policies currently and it also bears some responsibility for trends of cronyism and corruption, which Joshi identifies as a central weakness of the state.

Third, the book tends to treat the state and the private sector as

somewhat monolithic and uniform in their capacities. In this regard, Sinha's analysis, which is discussed in the next section, offers a contrasting viewpoint. Importantly, her analysis, backed by in-depth case studies of the textile and pharmaceutical sectors, suggests a significant reconfiguration of the business-state relationship in the realm of trade policy after the late 1990s. Her account, albeit one that is narrower in scope than Joshi's book, shows that in response to certain imperatives of globalization, the Indian state and private business came much closer together after the late 1990s and actively collaborated and consulted with each other in formulating a coherent response that resulted in greater global integration. Importantly, for Sinha, the Indian state "facilitated deeper integration than expected and has been at the forefront of change in trade policy and economic institutions as well as markets" (Sinha, 274). According to her, we are witnessing a "new developmental state" in India, "one that combines statism with multiple plural interests" (Sinha, 281). What her book implies for Joshi's analysis is that state capacity in India is very uneven and the state's willingness to collaborate with the private sector may differ along different policy dimensions. Moreover, both the state and the private sector in India may be more fragmented and diverse than Joshi's analysis assumes.

In terms of the links between Indian democracy and its economic model, Joshi's book primarily treats the former as affecting the latter. However, not surprisingly, economic liberaliza-

tion has also had effects on Indian democracy. In particular, the lack of economic inclusiveness has contributed to the development of what Kohli refers to as a "two-track democracy" where the poor are primarily consigned to the electoral sphere while the elite dominate policymaking. Exclusionary economic trends have also meant that electoral mobilization continues to occur primarily along lines of identity and other symbolic aspects. As such, there may be a more complex two-way link between democracy and economic performance than the book accounts for.

The book tends to focus mainly on technocratic solutions such as cash transfers or basic income in the context of inclusion and social protection. However, welfare measures in many parts of the world have come about as the result of contentious, bottom-up politics placing pressure on states. As such, an active civil society and social movements that place pressure on the state to deliver may be central to trends of inclusion, not simply a restriction of the scope of the state's activities and transfer of delivery to the private sector that Joshi focuses on. Finally, while the case for a radical reform agenda is compelling, the book is largely silent about what the catalysts for such change might be. Joshi very briefly considers the role of the middle class as well as that of state governments at the end of the book, but a more substantial discussion on these potential catalysts would be useful.

The Interplay of International and Domestic Factors in India's Global Integration

Joshi's book follows a significant portion of the scholarship in Indian political economy that tends to view India's transformation as well as its economic future primarily through the lens of national or domestic variables. The scholarship has largely focused on the role of internal economic changes in driving India's global transformation. In contrast, Aseema Sinha in *Globalizing India* moves away from "methodological nationalism" and analyzes the joint interaction of global factors and domestic factors in a more complex manner. In doing so, she develops a "Global Design-in-Motion framework" and "starts with a 'second image reversed' argument" that focuses on how international variables affect domestic politics. She goes on to examine which specific aspects of globalization (rules or markets) shape and change Indian preferences and interests toward global integration.

The empirical puzzle that Sinha focuses on relates to India's rapid global economic integration after the late 1990s, specifically in the realms of trade and multilateral engagement. Sinha suggests that a paradigmatic shift began occurring in the late 1990s. Catalyzed primarily by a change in the global trade regime and the formation of the WTO in 1995 in particular, India witnessed substantial and rapid trade liberalization, and began to assertively participate in multilateral forums after the late 1990s. Focusing on this marked shift af-

ter the late 1990s, Sinha's book asks how India achieved rapid global integration, and analyzes the factors that propelled and facilitated this integration.

To address this central question, the book draws on in-depth empirical evidence from two sectors—pharmaceuticals and textiles. The book includes eight chapters. Chapter 1 sets the stage for the analysis and offers a brief preview of the argument, while Chapter 2 elaborates on the theoretical framework. Chapter 3 meticulously documents the changing nature of tradecraft and state capacity in India necessitated by changes in the global trade regime. Chapters 4–6 include empirical evidence from case studies of the pharmaceutical and textile sectors. After outlining the changes in these two sectors, Chapter 7 addresses the role of market and nonmarket mechanisms in driving these changes, and Chapter 8 concludes.

In answering what propelled India's substantial and deep global integration after the late 1990s, the book highlights the critical role played by international institutions and rules in transforming the Indian state, the private sector, and in affecting the nature of state–business relations. The catalyst for change in India's trade policies was external effects related to the WTO as well as global markets and geopolitics. These external levers, in turn, initiated "changes in state capacity and a new tradecraft" (15). After the loss of two major cases at the WTO in 1998, "India's trade policy regime changed radically in the late 1990s (after 1998)" (15). The

nature of changes were extensive, and involved transformations in policies, the policymaking process, and state/institutional capacity. In addition, “reformist woodwork politicians” emerged with reformist bureaucrats disrupting vested interests, and new institutions, new collaborations, and new coalitions in support of trade reform were forged. Importantly, global changes resulted in the state collaborating more closely and actively with business.

Through what mechanisms did global factors transform India’s domestic political economy? Sinha points to three global factors—geopolitics, global markets, and the WTO. Geopolitics, and the changing balance of power, created new sovereignty costs and changed the external environment for India. These changes resulted in a pro-U.S. shift and a wariness of China, and were the initial necessary conditions for domestic policy change. Such systemic factors combined with new opportunities and threats arising from global markets, which mobilized private sector actors as well as state actors to design new policies and institutions to deal with external changes. The third set of influences arose from global institutions, specifically the WTO, which generated nonmarket effects, pushed against policy autonomy, and resulted in onerous transaction and implementation costs that catalyzed new domestic responses and capacities.

In addition to driving domestic changes in policies, the policymaking process, and state capacity, the process of external integration also changed the nature of coalitions and interests

domestically. Global changes disrupted vested interests and coalitions that favored protectionism and, importantly, “new winners and incipient reformers emerged from the woodwork within both within the state and the private sector” (19). In addition, new losers were unable to mobilize the state. For Sinha, “more coherent and strong actions by Indian policy and private actors at the global level ... are the consequence not the cause of global integration” (19).

Sinha marshals extensive empirical evidence from a variety of sources, including interviews, newspaper archives, and a variety of primary sources to support her argument. She offers a detailed analysis of how global integration played out in the pharmaceutical and textile sectors, which support her claim of the causal role of global factors in driving domestic changes.

State, Business, and Globalization

In many ways, Sinha’s incisive and empirically meticulous analysis contributes significantly to the current political economy literature. For a start, as mentioned earlier, Sinha’s book successfully accomplishes her aim of moving away from ‘methodological nationalism’ and she makes a convincing theoretical and empirical case for analyzing the joint effect of global and domestic factors in certain questions of Indian political economy.

A second contribution involves her treatment of the reforms process. A bulk of the political economy scholarship tends to view economic reforms

process as one, continuous process that began in 1991 (or for some scholars, in the 1980s). The scholarship also often tends to conflate various policy dimensions involved in India's economic liberalization. Moreover, following Jenkins (1999), numerous studies characterize the process of reforms as incremental and carried out by "stealth." In contrast, Sinha highlights the distinct nature of "second generation reforms" in the area of trade policy, which in her view were extensive (not incremental) and rapid. This is a significant contrast to Joshi's general description of the reforms process. As such, her study implies that the Indian reforms process is potentially uneven in terms of speed and scope along different policy dimensions, and disaggregating reforms along different policy dimensions is likely to be a useful exercise.

A third contribution of her book is the nuanced treatment of the state and the state-business relationship. In contrast to accounts that discuss a secular decline in state capacity in India over the last few decades, the Indian state in Sinha's analysis played a major role in facilitating global integration. In that sense, her analysis, in contrast to Joshi's, suggests that the state might still be able to play a positive role in facilitating development in certain policy realms. Indeed, she suggests that there is evidence of a new developmental state in India, at least in the two sectors she analyzes, which has sufficient capacity to propel change and enjoys a close relationship with the private sector. Moreover, she suggests that this new developmental state is distinctive in combining "statism

with multiple plural interests" (281). While emphasizing close relations between state and business fostered by greater global integration, Sinha is also careful to recognize that both the state and the private sector in India are fragmented and diverse; interests within each are not monolithic.

Apart from these strengths, Sinha's analysis leads to certain questions that the book does not address squarely. Sinha's book is defined in scope—it examines the realm of trade policy and it draws significantly on empirical evidence from the textile and pharmaceutical sectors. In the realm of external economic integration and in these two sectors, the state comes across as relatively effective and as enjoying considerable capacity. Yet, as Sinha recognizes but does not elaborate, state capacity is very uneven and indeed weak in many other areas. What explains why the Indian state is more effective in some realms than others? As such, the unevenness of state capacity suggests that the Indian state is not so much a new developmental state as Sinha classifies it, but a state that exhibits pockets of developmental efficacy in certain realms in the midst of general weakness and inefficiency. Moreover, this raises the question of whether trade policy is relatively unique. In particular, did the technocratic nature of trade policy insulate the state to a certain extent from "mass politics"?

Finally, throughout the book, Sinha paints a positive picture of the state-business relationship and ability of a close relationship in particular to effect positive change. In contrast to

accounts such as Joshi's, there is little discussion of the negative consequences of a close business-state relationship in terms of cronyism or corruption. This leads to broader questions on the state-business relationship in India. What factors determine whether a close relationship between state and business in India is likely to be developmental or descend into cronyism?

Conclusion: Internal and External Drivers of Reform

The three books reviewed offer different views on India's prospects for the future. They each also offer a different analysis of the drivers of India's geopolitical rise and economic growth, and the analyses complement each other. Thus, Ayres trumpets India's global rise and judges that its domestic economic foundations will keep reforming sufficiently to meet its growing needs. Joshi, meanwhile, argues that "high-quality"—more rapid and inclusive—economic growth will demand radical reforms, especially in the state–market relationship. And

Sinha adds that, in fact, international institutional changes have prompted the Indian state to lead extensive and rapid reforms, at least in some sectors. As these three volumes show, India's economic and geopolitical rise depend on a very complex interplay of domestic and international factors, and of the state and market—no single solution or pathway of reform will sustain India's burgeoning requirements.

References

- Drèze, Jean, and Amartya Sen. 2013. *An Uncertain Glory: India and Its Contradictions*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Jenkins, Rob. 1999. *Democratic Politics and Economic Reform in India*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Kohli, Atul. 2012. *Poverty Amid Plenty in the New India*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.