The Political Project of Postcolonial Neoliberal Nationalism

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Abstract

The starting point of this article is the recognition of globally proliferating right-wing electoral successes of a specific kind that rely upon a weaving together of seemingly contradictory aspects of neoliberalism and nationalism. An important dimension of these globally occurring changes is that they reflect something more than simply the empirical instantiation of a right-wing success in any one specific context. They require us to unravel and understand the transmutations in the nature of the political and the economic in the contemporary postcolonial world. Here, I focus on the relevance of uncovering the powerful weave of nationalism, neoliberalism, and postcolonialism that lies behind such configurations of power; a governmentality I refer to as PNN (postcolonial neoliberal nationalism). An understanding of PNN requires us to challenge the a priori availability of analysis of either neoliberalism or nationalism in isolation; neoliberalism and nationalism are not only not contradictory to each other, but as projects of re-forming imaginaries, they co-constitute the ideas of “market/economy” and “nation/culture.” Furthermore, PNN makes visible the ambivalent status of “the West,” since it is imbued with the historical legacy of colonial memory re-called into the present as a revanchist pride, and combined with the conflicting aspirational/actual consumption desires to emulate the capitalist imperial metropolitan fantasies. I use the example of India to illustrate how PNN has been enacted as a technique of governmentality by the Modi-led BJP government through the reformulation of Swadeshi and the Make in India project.

Keywords: Nationalism, Neoliberalism, India, Postcolonial, Modi, Swadeshi, Governmentality, Hindutva, Economy, Culture
El proyecto político del nacionalismo neoliberal poscolonial

Resumen

El punto de partida de este artículo es el reconocimiento los crecientes éxitos electorales de la derecha en el mundo, los cuales son de un tipo específico y dependen del entrelazamiento de aspectos del neoliberalismo y el nacionalismo que parecen ser contradictorios. Una dimensión importante de estos cambios que ocurren globalmente es que reflejan algo más que simplemente la instanciación empírica de un éxito de la derecha en cualquier contexto específico. Nos exigen desarmar y comprender las transmutaciones en la naturaleza de lo político y lo económico en el mundo poscolonial contemporáneo. Aquí me enfoco en la relevancia de descubrir la poderosa coyuntura de nacionalismo, neoliberalismo y poscolonialismo que está detrás de estas configuraciones e poder: una condición de gobierno que llamó PNN (Nacionalismo Neoliberal Colonial). Una comprensión del PNN requiere que desafíemos la disponibilidad previa para el análisis del neoliberalismo o del nacionalismo de forma aislada; El neoliberalismo y el nacionalismo no solo no son contradictorios entre sí, sino que, como proyectos de nuevos imaginarios, co-constituyen las ideas de “mercado / economía” y “nación / cultura”. Además, el PNN hace visible el estado ambivalente de ‘Occidente’, ya que está impregnado del legado histórico de la memoria colonial, revivido en el presente como un orgullo revanchista, y combinado con los deseos de consumo aspiracional / real en conflicto para emular fantasías metropolitanas imperiales capitalistas. Utilizaré el ejemplo de India para ilustrar cómo el PNN ha sido promulgado como una técnica de gobierno por la administración BJP liderada por Modi a través de la reformulación de Swadeshi y el proyecto Make in India.

Palabras clave: nacionalismo, neoliberalismo, India, poscolonial, Modi, Swadeshi, condición de gobierno, Hindutva, economía, cultura
The Political Project of Postcolonial Neoliberal Nationalism

具备后殖民性质和新自由主义性质的民族主义政治计划

摘要

本文出发点认可了一种正在全球扩散的右翼选举成功，这种成功依赖于看似相互抵触的新自由主义和民族主义二者的相互交织。这些全球变化中重要的一面则是，变化不仅仅反映了右翼在任何特定背景下所获的成功。它还要求我们解开并理解当代后殖民世界中政治和经济方面的变化。笔者聚焦于发现民族主义、新自由主义和后殖民主义三者间相互交织的相关性，这种相关性潜伏于一种权力配置，后者是一种治理术，笔者称之为“具备后殖民性质和新自由主义性质的民族主义”（PNN）。理解PNN则需要对此前关于单独分析新自由主义或民族主义一事发起挑战；新自由主义和民族主义不仅不冲突，反而作为重塑假想的计划，共同组成了“市场/经济”和“国家/文化”的概念。此外，PNN将“西方”模棱两可的状态变得清晰，因为其充满了殖民历史影响——现称之为复仇主义自豪，同时也结合了冲突的/实际的消费欲望来模仿资本主义帝国都市幻想。作者以印度为例，阐述了由莫迪领导的印度人民党政府如何通过重塑“抵制外货”政策和“印度制造”计划，进而将PNN作为一种治理术。

关键词：民族主义，新自由主义，印度，后殖民，莫迪，抵制外货（Swadeshi），治理术，印度教民族主义，经济，文化

It is as if the masses have kept a secret to themselves while the intellectuals keep running around in circles trying to make out what it is, what is going on.

—Stuart Hall

Introduction

The starting point of this article is the recognition of globally proliferating right-wing electoral successes of a specific kind that rely upon a together of seemingly contradictory aspects of neoliberalism and nationalism. A significant number of elected right-wing leaders across the contemporary world are simultaneously championing both nationalism and
neoliberalism, but at the same time, their rise is commonly seen in terms of a nationalist response to neoliberalism, one that is predicated upon an oppositional understanding of the dynamics of nationalism and neoliberalism. Further, they do this by motivating projects that combine appeals to nostalgia, futurity, and pride, in ways that entangle concepts of nation and economy, and this is the case in countries that were formerly colonized, as well as those that were colonizers. This article is an attempt to unpack this conundrum, using the example of India.

An important dimension of these globally occurring changes is that they reflect something more than simply the empirical instantiation of a right-wing success in any one specific context. In fact, they require us to unravel and understand the transmutations in the nature of what is understood as the “political” and the “economic” in the contemporary postcolonial world. Before proceeding further, I emphasize that the signifier “postcolonial” is used here in a nonhyphenated manner, not in a “thin” sense to indicate the chronological aftermath of being colonized, but in a “thick” sense to indicate the significance of inhabiting a global present which continues to be marked by the colonial encounters and the ways in which the inherited legacies of “race,” “religion,” and “nation” are coded proxies for power that continue to shape the politics of the socio-economic behavior of individuals, the attitudes of collectivities, the implicit hierarchies of/within international institutions. In this sense, we all live in a postcolonial world (a world marked by the power asymmetries of the colonial encounter), where the colonial legacies may be re-called into the present as imperial nostalgia by the former colonizers, or as revanchist pride by the formerly colonized, but they continue to be salient nonetheless. Postcoloniality, thus, makes it incumbent upon us to take into account the role and status of the “West” in the way in which it continues to act as both an attractor and a repulser in the socio-economic architecture of global politics.

Keeping this in mind, and proceeding further, this paper is motivated by how, in the contemporary global moment marked by a simultaneous ascendancy of neoliberalism and nationalism, the categories “economic” and “political” are often assumed to function separately and with their own endogenous logics. Analyzing the dynamics of nationalism and neoliberalism in isolation obscures the ways in which these discourses co-constitute the spaces that later come to be identified as belonging to the “economy” or the “nation.” Hegemonic projects, such as those of the right wing in the present, owe their success to how they weave together what are generally perceived to be contradictory aspects of nationalism and neoliberalism. To highlight this, I will argue for an articulation of “postcolonial neoliberal nationalism” (PNN), proposing it to be the functioning of a governmentality that I will illustrate in the context of India.

Here, a space-clearing gesture would be to address the rationale for using the term neoliberalism. Clarke
generates a long list of sites, institutions, processes, and practices that he recognizes as being identified as neoliberal. It is a nonexhaustive list, and though he sees this as a potential problem when finding spaces of resistance uncontaminated by neoliberalism, I would argue that articulating neoliberalism with nationalism and postcoloniality, in fact, “reduces its density and totalizing weight—and the analytical and political breathlessness that such weight induces.” This is because a conceptualization of “PNN” allows a more complex understanding of the terms on which the economic and the cultural, or the nation and the international, or the state and the market become visible to us as separate, and the ideological work performed by seeing these domains as having endogenous internal logics.

For instance, the example of India under the BJP (Bharatiya Janata Party) rule is one where neoliberal practices get legitimized as a matter of nationalist pride for they are deemed to enable the “rise” of postcolonial India. In India, through its use of PNN, the BJP wants to emulate the West in terms of neoliberal policies, keep it at bay in terms of ideas of secularity, and compete with it by “rising” as a global power.

Existing work on the intersections of neoliberalism and nationalism in the Indian context largely focuses on trajectories of capital accumulation and social forces mediated by the dynamics of class, caste, region, and religion that led to the dramatic rightward shift in Indian politics and economy toward the end of the twentieth century onward. Vanaik succinctly outlines the key paradoxes of Indian society as fractured by various social forces—liberal democracy inserted into a predominantly rural society, regionally diverse, with divisive religious politics yet integrative caste politics, divided along linguistic electoral lines, industrializing with differential and uneven cultural and political weight distribution among rural and urban elites, making the middle class a base for Hindutva politics, and a Left that is no threat to the bourgeoisie. Against this backdrop, the changes of the recent years have, on one hand, been conceptualized as a transition from developmental to cultural nationalism, so that while the former was rooted in the paradoxes of political economy, the latter fetishizes culture to account for the lack of material transformations that were envisaged. On the other hand, the recent changes have also created the impetus for new analyses that link the ways the Hindutva project has sought to marketize religion by a repositioned understanding of state, society, and markets, that facilitates entrepreneurial, self-regulating, spiritual notion of citizenship that suits both market interests and religious nationalism. The argument in this paper is sympathetic to, and complementarily builds upon, these directions of inquiry; however, this paper is not an interrogation of the historical Indian project of nation and class formation, or a postulation of the chronological transitions within this trajectory, or an attempt to account for the successful rise to power of the BJP in India.
The claims made here are as follows: there is an interpretive value in challenging the oppositional understanding of neoliberalism and nationalism where it exists (and notwithstanding the exceptions discussed above, it is a ubiquitous dichotomy); it allows us to make visible how this binary facilitates a systematic local/international, material/symbolic, regressive/progressive mapping; it enables us to refuse the distinction between political economy and cultural politics so as to reclaim an analytical space for a governmentality approach that focuses on the functioning of the always already co-constituted imaginaries of “nation” and “economy” in the construction of subjects to obtain consent for specific policy regimes.

The final prefatory remark would be to note that the “non-West” is often taken to be the site that demonstrates the validity, applicability, or otherwise of theoretical approaches that come from, and draw upon, the experiences and dynamics as understood in the “West.” In this sense, this paper also adopts a postcolonial epistemological stance, whereby through the discussions related to uncovering a nuanced form of governmentality in India, it is also an invitation to other scholars to explore how these dynamics play out in the West, where the hegemonic right-wing successes of the recent years have relied upon inverted imaginaries (in, for instance, projects such as “Brexit” and “Make America Great Again”) of recovering, not a pre-colonial purity and power, to heal from a colonial wound as in postcolonial (hyphenated chronological sense of the word being used here) countries, but a desire for return to a (quasi)imperial past as political nostalgia that also allows the combining of seemingly contradictory aspects of neoliberalism and nationalism.

Rethinking the Narratives

Neoliberalism and Nationalism are rarely analyzed for the ways in which they are intertwined, and more often pitted against each other as opposing tendencies. In exceptional cases, when the two are reconciled, it still relies upon a schematic understanding of two autonomous domains with their own endogenous logics.¹¹

Neoliberalism is generally characterized by the way in which it de-territorializes capital, disrupts traditional communitarian affiliations of identity, and weakens the underlying foundations of the nation-state by shifting power toward the globally mobile transnational corporate entities, and away from the governments that are faced with ever greater constraints in terms of what they can regulate, how, and to what extent. Nationalism, on the other hand, is seen in terms of how the nation either creates an associated sense of identity and belonging or how the collective imagining of a nation, as an entity, manufactures a sense of belonging and affiliation. In line with this, the dominant narratives of the present see the successes of the right wing as a nationalist reaction to the neoliberal transformation. There are a number of analyses that seek to focus on the victory of a Trump or a Modi as a reaction of the working classes or the poor who
have lost out from the process of neoliberal globalization. It is possible to complicate this picture, both empirically (such as by analyzing the socio-economic backgrounds of the specific demographics who voted for the right-wing) and, as I will go on to argue, theoretically.

Even in more nuanced considerations of the interrelations between neoliberalism and nationalism, the underlying narrative remains one of there being an oppositional relationship between the two. For example, looking at neoliberalism in terms of an ideology, a strategy and an era, Davidson and Saull study its contradictions when it is embraced by the nonrevolutionary, restoration politics of the far-right. They write: “Neoliberalism, then, has helped create the conditions for the re-emergence of the far-right whilst, at the same time, the far-right has focused on attacking what it sees as the symptoms of neoliberalism through racializing its social, political and economic effects.” Assessing the changing fortunes of political traditions, Crouch sees the coalitions among parties representing neoliberalism and conservatism as “an alliance of two horses going in divergent directions.” Here too, we find this idea: “Through their endorsement of neoliberal change, conservatives help usher in globalisation, but through their identification with the nation they can then gain from the revived nationalism that opposition to globalisation stimulates.” This contradiction between the two is also often mapped through the global and the local binary. Castro-Rea traces the ascendancy of the neoliberal project in Mexico as an iteration of a modernization project which had a defining moment when NAFTA was adopted; “inspired from abroad, based on alien cultural assumptions, yet sitting on the side of institutional political power,” it is a project doomed to fail because it is fundamentally at odds with a “deep Mexico,” the indigenous “México profundo” of Mesoamerican civilization.

These narratives hinge upon, and require, a systematic understanding of an oppositional binary as the key dynamic between the global and local, the material and the symbolic, the neoliberal and nationalist. They can be problematic for at least two reasons. On one hand, they lay out and implicit grid of values where openness, cosmopolitanism, and progressivism can only ever fall on the neoliberal or the international (read western) side of the binary. Hence, the signifier West and its coming into being is insufficiently interrogated. On the other hand, maintaining these binaries requires the depoliticization of the category economic so that a certain modernist rendition of economic logic is presented to as transparent, universal, inevitable, and as the only possible form of rationality.

By making sense of the dynamics and the impacts of neoliberalism and nationalism in separate registers, we miss out on understanding precisely how a separate and separable understanding of neoliberalism and nationalism makes it possible for a governmentality to operate by fashioning a kind of political subjectivity that feels
about the nation but accepts the economy as beyond the “common person.” If, following Foucault, government is seen as the “conduct of conduct,” governing can be understood as controlling the possible field of action of others, as the producing of governable subjects. An analysis of governmentality is therefore inclusive of understanding the practices of government within institutions of the state and the process of governing and the mentality of government toward the end of manufacturing the will of the governed. An analytics of government is also to ask how the practices of governing give rise to specific forms of truth.

If we see neoliberalism and nationalism in isolation, we observe that at the heart of neoliberal utopian governmentality lies the aim of creating subjects who are active, efficient, and able; which is to say that they give consent to their own calculable deployment in a fluid, amoral, unembedded, and transparent manner. In contradistinction to this, the kind of submission required of the aims of the nationalist utopian governmentality is different; the subject possesses the ability to act on emotions and yet be bounded by the authority of tradition. The reproduction of these ideals is driven by imaginaries, but these are not necessarily continuous imaginaries. Moreover, in a postcolonial world, the imaginaries of both these discourses rely upon both pride and futurity in ways that end up seeming contradictory—so we have, right-wing nationalists in power who promise to return glory to a nation, and simultaneously support both closer relationships with their economic rivals, cut corporate taxes, outsource and invite foreign investment, remove labor and environmental regulations, and speak of enforcing tariffs and support of domestic jobs and industries. They are both nationalist and neoliberal at the same time. Far from being inept or acting in error, these departures from the standard scripts of nationalism and neoliberalism in the economic and cultural domains are key to the hegemony of the project of the Right today.

With this in mind, it is possible to argue the following. Neoliberalism, as a technique of governmentality, works by creating political outcomes that are seen as purely economic ones by its adherents. It works to create a society where capital is privileged over labor, those with more capital are privileged over those with less, and where attempts to change the former two (i.e., trying to alter the balance to revalue labor, or revalue those with less capital) by any means of policy (for example, unionization, regulation, nationalization instead of “flexible” labor markets, deregulation, privatization) is seen as unscientific, irrational, or both, by defining and facilitating the understanding of rationality in purely economic terms and economic/s as a scientism devoid of history or ideology. Neoliberalism, as a technique of governmentality, produces individuals subjected to this power of capital over labor, and keeps in place the epistemic obstacles to recognizing and altering this balance. Furthermore, the neoliberal axis of power is vertical. Neoliberalism can be said to create a differentiation
though the Hegelian power relation of the Master and Slave. The state and the neoliberal market forces encounter and proceed to a struggle, whereby the state may see its powers eroded by the neoliberal reforms that enable transnational corporations to make a play of its injunctions, or it may see itself as a bolstering ally of these same corporations as it creates injunctions to enable the play of neoliberalism. The state is not in any fundamentally determinist sense opposed to the market, the state can be rolled back by the market, or it may be expanded as a useful ally of the market. One might even say in a Hegelian vein that the market only becomes “free” with the help of the state.

Nationalism, as a technique of governmentality, works by creating political outcomes that are seen as intrinsically cultural by its adherents. It works to create a society where a majority is manufactured into the rightful Self and defined against an enemy Other, and any attempts to challenge the existence or nature of the dividing line are seen as unpatriotic, irrational, or both, by defining and facilitating an understanding of patriotism on the terms of the majority alone, and presenting rationality as pure Self-interest. Nationalism, as a technique of governmentality, produces individuals subjected to the divide between the Self and the Other in/of the nation. In a necessary circularity, the nation is defined as preceding the nationalism that it supposedly naturally creates. Nationalism creates differentiation through the Schmittian horizontal power hierarchy of the Friend and the Enemy. The State, again, can be nationalist and colonial, or postcolonial nationalist and colonial in terms of how it sees the enemy. The State may abet majority nationalism, or it may seek to undermine it.

The postcolonial nature of the present means that both nationalism and neoliberalism have the nation-state entangled right at the heart of their understanding, a tranversality that cuts through dynamics of neoliberalism and nationalism. The positing of the nation-state as a dominant form for organizing our understanding of socio-economic dynamics is worth noting in terms of coloniality of the nation-state form and the commodification of the nation-state form.

The contemporary nation-state is Eurocentric—in its conceptual origin, in the key institutions that facilitate interactions between such nation-states, and in the hierarchical imaginaries associated with them and their colonial/“race” basis. The twentieth-century era of decolonizations was also simultaneously the proliferation of the nation-state as a form in the newly postcolonial states. So, we have this hyphenated entity (the nation-state) that acts as a focal referent for the exercise of power in relation to territory, identity, and capital. This overworked idea of the nation-state in the present carries many burdens: citizens must feel pride in the nation, but not nationalize their industries; the systems must work on neoliberal tenets derived from neoclassical economic theory where equilibrium requires the free movement of the factors of production, but labor
cannot be allowed to move freely across the borders of nation-states; all internationally recognized nation-states are in theory equal legal persons, but in practice some are more equal than others. All the same, the nation-state must both be the source of nourishing affective belonging (give its citizens an empowering sense of identity that they can feel pride in) and also be able to reflect ever better in the global league of other such nation-states (the rate at which its economy grows); in other words, a nation-state must be able to tell the best possible story about itself to its own citizens and to the rest of the world. This is a task filtered through a processing of the coloniality of history and memory.

Colonialism was an erasure of multiple histories, and in the postcolonial world that we find ourselves in, memory itself is sought to be colonized. This is what the right-wing movements in the formerly colonized nation-states seek to do when they refer to the purity of a mythical national past prior to the “taint” of colonization. They promise a return to a more vigorous nation, which has regained its moral and civilizational purity, healing from the colonial wound by reaching back in time to relive the present as the glorious past. However, this is not all. The appeal of a successful right-wing movement in a formerly colonized state draws not merely from this identitarian nativism; it derives equally from the promise of a future where the healing of the colonial wound can only be complete by achieving a level of consumption and lifestyle “like the West.” In this sense, to have neoliberal ethos (to carry out the “reforms” needed) is to be modern like everyone else in the international system, to have the same consumption aspirations, to have finally achieved “a sense of pride” and a place in the sun. This powerful and interlinked postcolonial–neoliberal–nationalist imaginary gets an additional fillip when media discourses in the West mock the “backwardness” of non-Western nations. 22

Rather than perceiving the neoliberal, the nationalist, and the postcolonial, as inhabiting separate, though occasionally overlapping, registers, it is more fruitful to acknowledge the politics of this separation, and recognize that discourses and practices of neoliberalism and nationalism are tied with other ways of seeing/doing politics, and the present global resurgence of the right wing is happening in a world with postcolonial sentiment and re-sentiment. A PNN that co-constructs the idea of nation and economy—is at work as a strategy of governmentality that creates a political subjectivity where the population is faced with what one might call the “politics of the absurd.”

In this politics of the absurd, the conventional sense of what is “political” is partly lost. Nationalism, including identity, pride, and hatred, gets mobilized as a natural part of the affective politics, while questions of ideologies, distribution of wealth, survival, and/or livelihood that ought to be central to politics are put into the “safe house” of economy beyond the realm of public debate. Politics, as a field of contestation between competing and identifiably different ideological domains, recedes from view. Thus, a technocratic
rationality places what is properly political as the beyond of investigation and critique. The fundamental political and economic questions become obscured, while the population sees the effects of specific responses to such political and economic questions, presented to them as being inevitable. What is more, the technocratically determined idea of rationality in governance makes conflicts of interests become unidentifiable. That which is most obviously in view becomes structured in such a manner that it is naturalized and rendered obscure from questioning. For example, in this politics of the absurd, inequality becomes ever increasing, and yet impossible to address. An individual subject is overwhelmed by a simultaneity of helplessness and endless striving. The ideal subject of the nation-state is the one who is made by, and accepts unquestioningly, the PNN form of governmentality. As the case of India shows, with the combination of strategic silence and a deliberately proliferated lack of trust in general, questioning the emerging hegemonic discourse becomes difficult as the contradictions in its enactment come to be accepted as inevitable and necessary. Neoliberal nationalist ideas and practices come to be owned as postcolonial so long as it contributes to transforming the country into a rising power emulating, while still being different from, the West.

The Indian Case

When Neoliberalism is seen as an economic phenomenon and nationalism is seen as a cultural one, what does such a binary achieve?

The cultural effects of neoliberalism, insofar as they are recognized from a neoliberal point of view, are seen as being essentially freeing, secularizing, modernizing, in short, Westernizing for the better. The cultural effects of neoliberalism from a nationalist point of view are seen as degenerative, immoral; Westernizing for worse. The economic effects of nationalism insofar as they are recognized from a neoliberal point of view are seen as being essentially protectionist and anti-developmental, in short opposing a Westernizing for the better. The economic effects of nationalism from a nationalist point of view are seen as necessary and potentially profitable for nation-building.

Thus, when nationalism and neoliberalism are understood in mutually opposed registers, they enable both the immiserizing effects of neoliberalism (greater inequality, monetization of relations, commodification of intangibles) and the pernicious effects of nationalism (revanchism, anti-minority populism, conservatism) to be seen as “unintended consequences,” and not as central to the creation of the subjectivities needed for the constitution of neoliberalism or nationalism.

In India, the conundrum concerning the simultaneity of the historical arrival of neoliberalism (liberalization) and communalism (Hindu nationalism) illustrates how these two are usually analyzed separately, and thus, explanations that bridge this analytical gap are hard to find. For instance,
Chatterjee writes, “the juxtaposition of a globalizing economy and Hindu nationalism is not a coincidence, and it brings us back to an apparent paradox that has baffled many academics.” And sees the answer in terms of a frustration with economic hardships that translated into a frustration with secular nationalism. Likewise, Sarkar mentions how the “mass character suddenly acquired by the Hindu right ... remains an explanatory as well as a political problem.” He provides an overview of the explanations, noting their unsatisfactory and formulaic nature. The rise of the Hindutva nationalism is explained through the work done by the RSS and the recruitment strategies of the VHP; as an upper-caste backlash against the Mandalization; as a cultural/ethnic backlash against “globalization” which causes a surrender of the political and economic independence of the state; and as a response to the authoritarian and bureaucratic nature of Nehruvian developmental nationalism that preceded the religious nationalism of Hindutva. In all such analyses, the arrival of neoliberalism in India is studied in the sphere of economy, and the rise of Hindutva is analyzed in the cultural sphere—one is economic policy, the other is identity politics. The latter is often seen as a reaction to the former. The neoliberal reforms are seen as eroding the power of the state and the resort to nationalism of the religious kind serves to define a strong cultural identity in the midst of much drastic transformation of the landscape.

The argument here is that the economic policies of neoliberal reforms are no less nationalist or cultural in the way in which they conceptualize a “new India” that would be free of the shackles of the past and ready for the post-Cold War world. Both nationalism and neoliberalism are on a spectrum and in a relationship with each other, and they are defined as separate by making the effects of one appear cultural, and of the other, economic. Furthermore, the role and status of the “West” as an imaginary means that it is imbued with the historical legacy of colonial memory re-called into the present as a revanchist pride, and combined with the conflicting aspirational/actual consumption desires to emulate the capitalist imperial metropolitan fantasies. Neoliberalism and nationalism in the postcolonial context are better understood as two symptoms of this Western affect; both tied in to the Western epistemological construction of the economy and the nation-state, and thriving on the power effects that accompany this. The nonempirical signifier “West” is alternately fundamentalist and freeing in the universal pretense of its modernity. This lack of the West, that is conveyed by the prefix “non,” translates into what Chakrabarti and Dhar call the “dialectic of an imagined past and an imagined future” that comes with a self-description for economic third-worldism and need for development so that India initially affirms its lack of development, then seeks to grow out of its third-world status, and then emerge as an economic superpower. The contemporary right-wing ruling dispensation—the Modi-led BJP—legitimizes itself by arguing that it is best placed to help India emerge as a power...
like those countries seen as constituting the “West” without becoming “Western.” In this self-legitimizing narrative, neoliberalism, nationalism, and postcoloniality all operate in tandem.

An understanding of PNN allows not just an interrogation of the culture/development divide terms in nationalism, but it also helps us to question the way in which viewing the material and symbolic domains as separate enables the global/local to be seen as opposed on identity versus economy. In this way, postcolonial nationalism is not perforce regressive as against neoliberal globalization. Chatterjee, drawing upon Appadurai and Spivak, writes: “the global space is as much value-based as the local, it is also as much fragmented as the local, and can be as much progressive/regressive as the local.” By ignoring the fusing of the material and the symbolic in the global and national spaces, we end up with a situation where “the global governance institutions pretend to be neutral, only in control of the regimes of material production (economic level), and blaming the cultural production of identity, ethnic, and religious fragmentation solely on the regressive local.”

PNN allows for nationalism to be unshackled from an exclusively culturalist domain and be seen as imbricated in a postcoloniality (rather than just postcoloniality) that is marked by neoliberalism simultaneously in the national/international construction.

Finally, it might also be noted that the articulation of postcolonial with neoliberal with nationalism in the Indian context, as a way of understanding the changing architecture of socio-economic relationships, allows us to provide a different account of religion, one that does not place it beyond politics, but recognizes it as an integral part. The subsumption of religious particularity as politics in a democracy is not a uniquely postcolonial problem, but it becomes especially pertinent under the conditions of neoliberal nationalism with the hierarchical axes of vertical and horizontal power that call for a strategy of governmentality that is able to both monetize and expropriate religious belonging as necessary. To be “Hindu” today in contemporary India is therefore not simply about religion or nation. A political meaning to the Hindu identity is activated by linking it to entitlement and dispossession; defining it by the material or symbolic resources that it carries. This is evident in the discrimination faced by non-Hindus in a range of interactions where they are penalized, in the “wages of religious privilege” (to adapt Du Bois’s term “wages of whiteness”) available even to the impoverished Hindus, and in the proliferating business empires of religious Hindu gurus turned businessmen (such as Baba Ramdev) who package national purity for profit.

**Nation/Economy: Swadeshi and Make in India**

So far, I have argued that, in our contemporary world that is marked by postcoloniality, neoliberalism and nationalism are usually understood oppositionally, and that this oppositional understanding makes one appear eco-
conomic and the other cultural, as if each has their own endogenous and separable logics. Such an understanding relies upon, and allows for, the operation of a systematic mapping of a set of binaries such as local/international, material/symbolic, and regressive/progressive. Furthermore, it facilitates the construction of a kind of politics of the absurd where the essentially “political” nature of contestation over the most important social questions is surrendered in favor of an inevitability about what are seen as the “economic” dynamics, and instead, the active manipulation and co-construction of imaginaries of the “nation” and “economy,” such as by the right-wing hegemonic successful projects, as in India (and elsewhere), is seen in terms of nationalist responses to neoliberalism. The yoking together of postcolonial with neoliberal with nationalist as I have done here, to propose the functioning of a governmentality termed PNN, is presented as an approach that allows for the recognition of what is obscured and obfuscated when these dynamics are understood in separate analytical registers. In other words, this governmentality approach reclaims the understanding of a political space linked to the functioning of imaginaries in the construction of subjects in order to obtain consent for specific policy regimes. In this final section, I discuss this political traffic between nation/economy imaginaries with reference to the Indian example case of Swadeshi and “Make in India” projects.

Ideas about the co-construction of the nation and the economy can be run together in several ways. At its most basic, there is a resonance in the imaginary of the nation as a motherland or fatherland that demands sacrifice, submission, and duty, and the anthropomorphic metaphors of the economy, such as that of the market as an individual prone to “nervousness” in the case of adverse (for example, labor-favoring) policies. Here, I wish to focus on how the imaginary of the economy can be yoked and co-constructed with that of the nation to make it possible to generate consent for different kinds of policies which might seem contradictory at first glance.

In the *bildungsroman* of the BJP and its precursor organizations in India, we can read these chapters on the fusions and transformations of economy/nation. If the contemporaneous arrival of neoliberalism and Hindutva nationalism in India are seen to generate a paradox, consider how and why the BJP, as a Hindu nationalist party, furthered “globalization” (read neoliberalism) when it succeeded in gaining power as part of the NDA coalition in 1999 and then came to power with massive majority in 2014. The answer to this is because BJP’s successes, like those of similarly ascendant right-wing parties elsewhere, rely upon the exercise of PNN; the economic and cultural are intertwined in the so-called culturalist Hindutva vision of the BJP, its Sangh Parivar allies and its antecedent parties. Let me illustrate this with the example of the fusing of “Swadeshi” to “Make in India.”

Swadeshi, which literally means “of one’s one country,” in the economic sense of promoting indigenous goods or domestic industry, especially cloth or
textiles, and boycotting foreign-made goods, became an important symbol and movement of self-reliance during the anti-colonial nationalist movement in India. As Bayly notes, “In the hands first of Bengali leaders and later of Mahatma Gandhi and his supporters, the need to support swadeshi (home) industries and boycott foreign goods was woven through with notions of neighbourliness, patriotism, purity, and sacrifice, all of which provided unifying ideologies more powerful than any single call for political representation and independence.” The Gandhian notion of swadeshi and its associated link with self-reliance was appropriated by the RSS and its early ideologues. Iwanek explains how right from its birth, “swadeshi had both a nationalist and economic edge to it”; stating that the RSS leader Deoras (from 1973 to 1994, i.e., during the time of the economy “opening up” and later Hindutva ascendency onwards through the Babri Masjid demolition episode) supported swadeshi and opposed trade liberalization. The SJM or the Swadeshi Jagran Manch was formed during his time in 1991 to oppose “Liberalization, Privatization, Globalization” (LPG). In the early 1990s, when the Manmohan Singh-led Congress “liberalized” the economy, the BJP specified that they agreed with “internal liberalization” but not with “external liberalization” or globalization which they opposed through SJM-type affiliates of the Sangh Parivar. In spite of explicitly campaigning against this from early 1990s, when the BJP came to power in 1999, they promoted precisely these policies.

The BJP Finance Minister Yashwant Sinha during the NDA rule (1998–2002) redefined swadeshi to mean the following:

I understand swadeshi basically as a concept which will make India great. And India can be great only when we become an economic superpower .... We can be great by being able to compete. I think competition is the essence. I am a great believer in competition. We are willing to face it abroad and here. After the nuclear tests, to think that we will go the East India Company way, or that transnationals will come in and take over, or that they will exercise undue influence, that foreign investment should be resisted—these are all concepts which are not valid anymore. And therefore, swadeshi, liberalizer, liberalizer are not contradictions in terms. I personally think that globalization is the best way of being swadeshi.

Likewise, L.K. Advani, a senior-most BJP figure and a key member of the triumvirate that saw the BJP come to prominence in the early 1990s, said the following in a speech in 1998 when he was the Home Minister:

... globalisation is a fundamental fact of our times. Neither its reality nor its irreversibility can be questioned ... Swadeshi is a positive thought rooted In national self-confidence: ... By Swadeshi I mean the belief that there can
be no uniform solution to the problems of economic and social development in a world which is both inherently diverse and also unequally structured today because of historical factors .... Our achievements in culture, specially, an [sic] of great relevance to the world community facing an uncertain and worrying future. This is what I mean by Swadeshi. It has a positive content and thrust. It connotes national pride and self-confidence. It connotes Swavalamban or self-reliance. For no nation can solve its problems, much less attain heights of glory by becoming dependent on others .... Swadeshi, however, is not a negative belief which advocates isolationism. In an increasingly interdependent and interconnected world, no nation is given the luxury of isolationism. Globalisation yes, but on the solid foundations of Swadeshi.

Swadeshi is therefore both a national self-confidence necessary in a world where glory cannot come by being dependent on others, and, at the same time, it is also a facilitator for globalization in an interdependent world where isolationism is not an option. These redefinitions of swadeshi as national interest allow a simultaneity of commitment to swadeshi and to globalization, to Hindutva nationalism, and to neoliberalism. While scholars have pointed out the way in which the BJP has been inconsistent in its positions—Arulanantham refers to the “protean and nimble philosophy” of swadeshi and the “ideological flexibility” of the BJP, Jaffrelot mentions the “division of labour,” Noorani speaks of the “calculated ambiguity” of the Sangh Parivar and its leaders—the argument here is that a key element of the successful governmental strategy for the BJP has been the construction, representation, definition, and manipulation of the various domains that are later seen to relate to different aspects of economy and society. When the first nuclear test was conducted by India under the NDA government, this move was projected as being about national pride, yet the neoliberal economy was an equal part of this story. Nayar remarks upon this paradox, “the assertion of nationalism through the nuclear tests quickened the pace of government approval of foreign investment proposals in an endeavor to compensate for the fall in official trade flows and to strengthen the business lobby abroad against the sanctions.”

The concept of swadeshi—and the way it can structure understandings of national interest versus international compulsions, domestic industry (plus economic virtue) promotion versus appeals of multinational capital and business interests—is now transmogrified into the Modi-led BJP’s campaign of “Make in India.” The Make in India scheme was mentioned by Modi in his first Independence Day speech on August 15, 2014, and subsequently launched on September 25, 2014. A Make in India week was launched in Mumbai in February 2016, there have been other slick and expensive marketing campaigns. Its twitter summary
calls it “A major national program designed to facilitate investment, foster innovation, enhance skill development and build best-in-class manufacturing infrastructure.” There is considerable irony in how the well-recognized “Make in India” logo—a lion made up of interconnected gears—was designed by a foreign firm (a fact revealed by a Right to Information or RTI application), or that at the launch event in September 2014, PM Modi stood in front of a “Make in India” sign in English and in literally lettered Hindi (without any Hindi translation) and spoke of his definition of FDI for Indians as “First Develop India.”

The official Make in India page says the following:

Program

The Make in India program was launched by Prime Minister Modi in September 2014 as part of a wider set of nation-building initiatives. Devised to transform India into a global design and manufacturing hub, Make in India was a timely response to a critical situation: by 2013, the much-hyped emerging markets bubble had burst, and India’s growth rate had fallen to its lowest level in a decade. The promise of the BRICS nations had faded, and India was tagged as one of the so-called “Fragile Five”. Global investors debated whether the world’s largest democracy was a risk or an opportunity. India’s 1.2 billion citizens questioned whether India was too big to succeed or too big to fail. India was on the brink of severe economic failure.

Process

... It was a powerful, galvanising call to action to India’s citizens and business leaders, and an invitation to potential partners and investors around the world. But, Make in India is much more than an inspiring slogan. It represents a comprehensive and unprecedented overhaul of out-dated processes and policies. Most importantly, it represents a complete change of the Government’s mindset—a shift from issuing authority to business partner, in keeping with Prime Minister Modi’s tenet of “Minimum Government, Maximum Governance”.

Progress

... The most striking indicator of progress is the unprecedented opening up of key sectors—including Railways, Defence, Insurance, and Medical Devices—to dramatically higher levels of Foreign Direct Investment .... Today, India’s credibility is stronger than ever. There is visible momentum, energy and optimism. Make in India is opening investment doors. Multiple enterprises are adopting its mantra. The world’s largest democracy is well on its way to becoming the world’s most powerful economy.
The backdrop of these statements is vital to unpack. In 2013, the various vested interests with an effective voice and exit option, distilled and anthropomorphized as “market sentiments,” were volatile, and as the 2014 elections neared, it was made clear that the “time for making bold new reforms is running out, with national elections due to take place by May 2014.” Deconstructing the framing of the “Make in India” introduction for how it juxtaposes the political/economic/cultural, we can see how the Make in India is meant to be the “nation-building” program that has been delivered by Modi, the man who “saved” the failing economy, and a democracy that was “too risky to be banked” upon. The elections in May 2014 that brought the Modi-led BJP to power were preceded by a juggernaut of corporate media reports and a densely saturated media where Modi was everywhere, including where he was not, by way of his holograms. In order to bring the savior into power as the CEO of the country as company (he was indeed felicitated in terms of the country getting a new CEO), the nation/economy had to be represented as failing. With the GDP growing at just below 5%, the pressure was being piled up by a range of actors in a way that the “economy” was being coded for the country, the (Hindu/business) nation, and “development” was the answer for all the malaise. There were promising returns in all these for the large investors/investment in Modi (his campaign was the most expensive in the history of the country, and every surge in his popularity ratings resulted in massive gains on the stock markets for businesses like Ambani and Adani, Modi’s long-term backers from Gujarat, who had invested in his political campaign), but developmental returns were promised to everyone in poverty who would be provided with “minimum government” in spite of reduction in inefficient government expenditure and “minimum governance.” A sense of pride was promised to every Indian overseas and within the country, upon the conditionality that they not be “anti-national”—where anti-nationals could be those opposing not just state violence (human rights activists) but also those opposing neoliberal exploitation (environmental activists). Under the right wing in India, these “anti-nationals” have become the target of serious abuse, vilified as “foreign funded” and “western-backed” for their protest against foreign/western companies that seek to exploit Indian resources and vulnerable local populations, by supporters of “nationalist” super-rich industrialists who seek to restore the nation to some untainted pre-colonial “Hindu” past, while also making it a Western-style economy of malls and four-lane super highways.

In this nation-building exercise of “Make in India,” swadeshi plays a curious role by its absence yet presence. The lack of mention of swadeshi on Make in India page may, at first, be interpreted as the sign of an aggressively neoliberal government that is, in fact, pro-market, and has given up on the “backward” sort of economic nationalism that its RSS grassroots supported and continue to support. However, on a closer look, this is contestable. Where
once the BJP’s success relied upon a melding of swadeshi and globalization, now that requires a further fusing with the idea of creating a global manufacturing hub.

As the examples below illustrate, Make in India is simultaneously claimed to follow from Gandhian Swadeshi and to promote economic nation-building through encouraging neoliberal incentives for foreign firms to manufacture in India which is now projected globally as a free-market-friendly deregulating economy. But, Make in India also seems to be consonant with import-substituting industrialization, which would be the conventional opposite of free-market principles. So, the Rajasthan Chief Minister Vasundhara Raje stated, “Mahatma Gandhi’s Swadeshi movement and the ‘Make in India’ programme were based on the same ideology,” adding that “Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s ‘Make in India’ encouraged the feeling of ‘swadeshi’ to make India economically independent and self-sustaining, which was the need of the hour.” Yet at the same time as Make in India claims to be opening “investment doors” in a free-market-friendly neoliberal new India, there is also the report that: “Prime Minister Narendra Modi has asked Union ministries to discourage ‘inessential imports’ and leverage the country’s manufacturing skills in substituting them. Towards this end, the Union ministries are required to furnish status reports every quarter and also brief the Prime Minister.” The response to this obvious import-substituting approach, which will rely upon the government investment rather than on FDI in Make in India, has been to call out Make in India as “swadeshi through the back door” and as something harking back to the days of “Be Indian, Buy Indian.”

As a result, while some have called Make in India “a more radical departure from the principle of swadeshi, consonant with a classical liberal understanding of ‘minimum government’ in national economic affairs,” others see it as “modest deregulation wrapped up in a swadeshi cloth,” and still others have called for “Make for India” and “Made by India.” The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) Governor at the time, Raghuram Rajan, cautioned that Make in India should instead be Make for India. In his view, Make for India should be focused on increasing domestic demand by pursuing a range of reforms, since a manufacturing-focused strategy of export-oriented industrialization will not work in the current global climate where other Asian economies are already well on way to pursuing such a strategy, and a strategy of import substitution will increase inefficiency, decrease competition, and increase costs to consumers. Rejecting this, the Finance Minister Jaitley said, “Whether Make in India is made for consumers within India or outside is not so relevant. The principle today says that consumers across the world like to purchase products that are cheaper and are of good quality. They hire services which are cheaper and good quality.”

Projecting meaning to these multiple domains of nation and economy which are co-constructed in a fluid sense as a governmental strategy of the ruling right wing in India, Make in India can
be seen as an abandonment of the ideal of swadeshi, as a timely reinterpretation of swadeshi in a globalized world, as a backdoor way of introducing swadeshi against the norms of free-market policies, as an exercise in national pride, as a way of signaling neoliberal openness.

**Conclusion**

Nationalism and neoliberalism are often understood to be opposed ideologies. This paper has argued that such an oppositional understanding, especially in light of the rise of the Right in the contemporary postcolonial world, misses the complex ways in which the two intermingle. Both nationalism and neoliberalism work together in a PNN governmentality that makes people, populations, and citizens, consent to specific policies, as ideas of nation-state and economy are co-constructed. The postcolonial nation-state, entangled in the middle, continues to mimic the West as well as repudiate it. I have attempted to uncover this nuanced form of governmentality (PNN) in the case of India and demonstrated its working through the example of BJP’s use of Swadeshi with Make in India. By appropriating neoliberal practices in the name of nation-building, the BJP transforms the idea of the Indian nation with claims of making it stronger and more suited to join the club of modern rising powers, and deploys nationalist rhetoric to domesticate any criticism of neoliberal policies. The BJP’s powerful stitching together of Swadeshi and Make in India logic shows that far from there being a contradiction in the ideologies of neoliberalism and nationalism in the way in which they are pitted against each other through the Market versus State narrative, the political and the economic are inextricably intertwined in the dynamic which is insufficiently understood if we look at neoliberalism or nationalism in isolation. The successes of the contemporary Right owe significantly to how they deploy both neoliberalism and nationalism as part of the same technique of governmentality, which is rooted in the appeal to a constructed postcolonial sentiment in the way in which it ties the rising power status to aspirations historically denied by the West.

**Notes**


2 This theoretical (and not merely chronological) sense of the postcolonial is analogous to that used in the groundbreaking volume *Empire Writes Back* in order to signal the “continuity of preoccupations” in the formal colonial period and afterwards. See Bill Ashcroft, Gareth Griffiths, and Helen Tiffin, *The Empire Writes Back: Theory and Practice in Post-Colonial Literatures* (London: Routledge, 1989). For further discussion and alternative assessments, see Peter Childs and R. J. Patrick Williams, *An Introduction to Post-Colonial Theory* (London: Prentice Hall/Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1997), 1–25.
This is a fact not just in the global South or the formerly colonized contexts where the idea of the “West” plays a very specific role, but also holds for non-Western countries like China where there is a subliminal presence of the West as an anchor of desire. Even for those contexts recognized as being Western, say the United States or the UK, the self-perception and terms of engagement with the “international” continue to be deeply imbued with an imperial nostalgia and an attendant pride in the memory of such power.

For a compilation of objections to the use of the term neoliberalism, see Rajesh Venugopal, “Neoliberalism as Concept,” *Economy and Society* 44 (2) (2015): 165–87. Critiquing widely quoted texts on the subject such as David Harvey’s, *A Brief History of Neoliberalism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005) and Jamie Peck’s, *Constructions of Neoliberal Reason* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), and giving a short shrift to Wacquant’s work on poverty and imprisonment, he argues for the term neoliberalism to be disposed off. Firstly, because it is over-stretched and has multiple and contradictory meanings, my counter-view would be that we must understand the multiple ways in which an “ambiguous” referent creates meaning. Secondly, because it is a term not used in economics (Venugopal, op cit. 16); hence, it creates a lack of understanding of economics as a discipline. Here, my response is that an opposition to the use of the term “neoliberalism” can also end up fetishizing and reifying economics as having an exclusive purchase on the appropriate descriptors of supposedly economic processes (on this, see Nitasha Kaul’s, *Imagining Economics Otherwise: Encounters with Identity/Difference*, London: Routledge, 2008). Should we not speak of poverty, given the way that the mention of it has been neglected in mainstream international economics? Aurora A. C. Teixeira and Luis Carvalho, in their article “Where Are the Poor in Mainstream International Economics?” *Poverty & Public Policy*, 6 (2014): 215–38, doi:10.1002/pop4.77, applied bibliometric techniques to analyze 1,800 articles published over a 40-year period (1971–2010) in the most orthodox journal in the field of international economics, and found that only 13 articles published in the JIE (*Journal of International Economics*), less than 1% of the total, addressed it in any of its dimensions.


Ibid. 145.


For more on the relevance of locating a postcolonial moment in epistemology, see Kaul 2008, op cit. 113–16.

between governments at an international level (harmonizing and eliminating competition on taxation, environmental, labor, or other regulatory standards) can unravel the neoliberal locking-in of “market-preserving” subnational federalism, so a version of nationalism is essential to thwart such agreements.


14 Ibid. 9.


16 Ibid. 226.


20 International relations (IR), being the discipline that has a purchase on how we understand the instantiation of, and interactions among, nation-states, is itself a body of knowledge with deeply colonial origins. As Pederson points out in her review of Robert Vitalis’ *White World Order, Black Power Politics: The Birth of American International Relations* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2015):

... at the moment of its American birth, “international relations meant race relations.” Races, not states or nations, were considered humanity’s foundational political units; “race war”—not class conflict or interstate conflict—was the spectre preying on scholars’ minds. The field of international relations was born to avert that disaster ... international relations was supposed to figure out how to preserve white supremacy in a multiracial and increasingly interdependent world.


Later, as international relations were renamed, analyzing the way racism worked internationally fell off the intellectual agenda as the issue became depoliticized, and when “race” was studied from the 1960s onwards, it was “in African–American studies programmes, not political science or international relations” (ibid.). Consider also that the precursor journal to *Foreign Affairs* was the *Journal of Race Development* (see Robert Vitalis, “The Noble American Science of Imperial Relations and Its Laws of Race Development,” *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 52 (4) (2010): 928–29), and that Germany was for a long time seen as not “Western” due to the Holocaust (on this, see Tarak Barkawi and Mark Laffey, “The Postcolonial Moment in Security
Cynthia Enloe, in her classic *Bananas, Beaches and Bases: Making Feminist Sense of International Politics* (London: University of California Press, 2000), makes important observations about the form of the nation-state. Her point is that although the nation-states have multiplied, the essentially patriarchal form of the nation-state has stayed the same. She writes (ibid. 64):

> Given the scores of nationalist movements which have managed to topple empires and create new states, it is surprising that the international political system hasn't been more radically altered than it has. But a nationalist movement informed by masculinist pride and holding a patriarchal vision of the new nation-state is likely to produce just one more actor in the international arena. A dozen new patriarchal nation-states may make the international bargaining table a bit more crowded, but it won't change the international game being played at that table.


Like “modernity,” the “West” is an over-imagined historical construct (see Kaul 2008, op cit. 91–93); throughout the world, this construct has played a role in engendering a subjectivity that has come to be understood as “Western,” this master concept has ensured that that which is identified with it, is in time, in step with time, its time.

neoliberalism in conflict, and refers to the way in which “nationalism took over the role of religion as ‘the heart of a heartless world’ ... the resurgence of religious belief is real, although not extensive enough to roll back all the achievements of secularisation, and it is almost everywhere it is subordinated to local nationalisms” (ibid. 37). My argument is that religion is a conspicuous and significant part of the nationalist vocabulary in the formerly colonized nation-states, even in contemporary times (and irrespective of whether this nationalist stance is supportive of, or positions itself in opposition to, neoliberalism). In contrast to the need for a colonial will to power to forget (forget to remember, while knowing) its religious roots, anti-colonial nationalism as a force of resistance to colonization was often articulated in a religious language, and this is a rich vein for contemporary postcolonial neoliberal nationalism too.

The secular idiom of anti-colonial nationalist resistance, which was more elite, is much more recognizable in Western political scientific literature; this is because, first, although historically rooted in spreading Christianity, narratives of Western colonization actually became established and rehearsed in terms of in political economy of rationality, and management of territory and peoples; and second, because resistance to coloniality grounded in religion is often classified and bracketed with knowledge that belongs to anthropology and not international relations or politics proper.


Linguistically speaking too, there is a history of how words construct imaginaries of power. The term Company Sarkar was used for the East India company that literally referred to a colonial corporation that acted as government; “Sarkar” or ruler added a positively connotated idea of dignity and respect to the pedestrian commercial nature of a company. In contrast, the term Permit Raj was used for the pre-reform era of post-colonial India that literally referred to a state bureaucratic monopoly that acted colonially; “Raj” or kingdom adding a negatively connotated idea of arbitrary rule that ended when the economy was “opened up” and the nation was free to pursue its destiny in the new world.

In September 2016, the Indian PM Modi announced a “surgical strike” had been carried out against Pakistan; it was a move that deflected attention from an uprising in Kashmir and created a sense of consent around the idea of “nation.” In November 2016, the PM again suddenly announced a demonetization policy by calling it a “surgical strike” on “black economy.” The idea of surgical strikes in the interests of the nation and in the interests of the economy created legitimacy for problematic policies and action for/against specific vested interests.


39 SJM was founded in 1991 to oppose “liberalisation, privatisation, globalisation” (LPG) by the RSS ideologue Dattopant Thengadi, who had also formed the Bharatiya Mazdoor Sangh (BMS) in 1955 and Bharatiya Kisan Sangh (BKS) in 1974, these being workers’ and farmers’ unions, respectively. However, as Iwanek (ibid. 24) clarifies, in spite of mobilizing labor and rejecting capitalism, these unions also do not imitate communist-style unions: “the organization [BMS] rejects the idea of a class struggle, uses a saffron flag (like other Hindu nationalist organizations) instead of a red one and celebrates Workers’ Day not on 1st of May, but on Vishwakarma Day (Vishwakarma was a god of artisans).”


43 Op cit.

44 Op cit.


46 Op cit. 808.

47 The twitter handle for @makeinindia in April 2016 also launched a “twitter seva” (service by twitter); note the significant echoes of the word “seva” in the vocabulary of Hindutva. The demolition of Babri Masjid in Ayodhya in December 1993 was carried out by kar sevaks, the RSS itself is the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh. The concept of “service” is at once moral and also a modification of the morality to include a managerial meaning in this present reincarnation.

48 The news broke in January 2016 when a Madhya Pradesh-based activist, Chandra Shekhar Gaur, asked the Union commerce and industry ministry under the RTI Act who had made

No tenders were invited for designing Make In India logo. In 2014–15, tenders were invited by the ministry for appointing a creative agency. And on its basis, Wieden+Kennedy India Limited, was chosen. And it’s this company which designed the logo for Make In India .... According to the ministry’s response, the advertising agency was hired for the advertising and promotions of the entire Make In India campaign for a period of three years and paid Rs 11 crores for the same.

The logo is described by its creators as having been derived from the Indian national emblem and that “the prowling lion stands for strength, courage, tenacity and wisdom—values that are every bit as Indian today as they have ever been.”

The aporia of nation in a globalized world of neoliberal policies and a need to create postcolonial pride can be traced back in time. For example, Wyatt (2005a, op cit. 469) states: “Indians will not necessarily build the temples of postmodern India.” He writes this is with reference to a 2004 India Brand Equity Foundation (IBEF) investment brochure funded by the Government of India but posted on a website owned by an agency of the Government of Singapore, in which the hope was expressed that “Asia’s construction giants” will create the FDI-funded integrated townships of new India.


54 A search with the term “swadeshi” brings up no results anywhere in the comprehensive archives of the Make In India project and documents. And yet, the wikipedia entry begins “Make in India, a type of Swadeshi movement covering 25 sectors of economy.” While the government trumpets its success, the assessment by others is less than mild: “Almost nothing has gone as planned to attract investors to make in India”; on this latter, see “PM Modi Calls the World to ‘Make In India,’ But The Initiative Fails to Take Off,” *Forbes*, July 24, 2017, accessed March 26, 2018, https://www.forbes.com/sites/suparnadutt/2017/07/24/missing-the-mark-pm-modi-courts-the-world-to-make-in-india-but-the-initiative-fails-to-take-off/#74f37c4c785c.


For instance, Iwanek, Op cit. 30.

